Iraq: Next Phase in the Campaign?; Strategic Insights, v. 1, issue 2 (March 2002) by Russell, James & Brovo, IIliana
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2002-04-01
Iraq: Next Phase in the Campaign?;
Strategic Insights, v. 1, issue 2 (March 2002)
Russell, James
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 1, issue 2 (April. 2002)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11311
Strategic Insight 
Iraq: Next Phase of the Campaign? 
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April 2, 2002 
The Bush Administration's foreign policy is now being driven by a set of principles described by President 
Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address. Characterized by various observers as the "Bush Doctrine," 
the outlines of this policy are: (1) that the United States will combat terror wherever it exists using all 
means at its disposal, including force; (2) that bilateral relationships around the world will be increasingly 
defined in terms of those countries that support the war on terrorism and those that do not; and (3) that 
"rogue" nations and/or terrorist organizations cannot be permitted to acquire and/or threaten the United 
States with weapons of mass destruction. 
President Bush identified three countries - Iran, Iraq and North Korea -- as the "axis of evil" and needing 
particular attention in the next phase of the war on terror. Subsequent remarks by the President and 
senior officials make clear that acting against Iraq and its brutal dictator Saddam Hussein are the focus in 
the next phase of implementing the Bush Doctrine around the globe.[1]  
Given the many policy pronouncements and press leaks over the last several months, there is a general 
impression that the issue is no longer whether Saddam will be attacked but when the attack will take 
place. Various arguments are being advanced to support the case for military action against Iraq and 
regime change in Baghdad. The main rationale for military action as highlighted under the Bush Doctrine 
is Iraq's unmonitored and illegal program to maintain and develop weapons of mass destruction. 
President Bush and various senior officials are threatening unstated consequences if Iraq does not 
readmit Iraq weapons inspectors, thereby linking the WMD proliferation issue with the objective of regime 
change. It should be noted though that some officials are suggesting that the United States will continue 
to pursue and insist on regime even change even if Iraq readmits U.N. weapons inspectors.[2] 
Regime Change 
While the Clinton Administration openly embraced the idea of regime change in Iraq, it limited the pursuit 
of this objective to policy pronouncements and covert operations. The Bush Administration is apparently 
prepared to act more aggressively. One school of thought advocates ousting Saddam by using the 
"Afghanistan model," which would combine air power and U.S. ground troops working in concert with 
active opposition groups inside Iraq: the Iraqi National Congress (I.N.C.) which is based in London and is 
the recipient of non-lethal military training and assistance; two Kurdish parties administering the areas in 
Kurdistan over the so-called "line of control," the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (led by Jalal Talabani) and 
the Kurdish Democratic Party (led by Masood Barzani); and Shi'ite Muslims in the south led by Sayed 
Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim under an umbrella organization called the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The idea is that U.S. airpower in conjunction with special operations forces on 
the ground could create "safe havens" for these groups to expand and/or create (in the case of the INC) 
geographic areas of control in a direct challenge to Saddam. Some believe that such an active challenge 
will prompt Iraqi military elements opposing Saddam to mount a long-awaited coup - solving the problem 
without a sizable conventional military operation.[3]  
Others are not so sanguine and believe that a sizable conventional military operation will be necessary 
involving thousands of U.S. military personnel that will have to be built up in the region over the course of 
several months. This line of argument suggests that the opposition as currently constituted simply cannot 
challenge a conventional military that retains over 400,000 men under arms, with several thousand tanks 
and several hundred combat aircraft. Despite a conventional military structure that has been severely 
degraded by the U.N. trade embargo over the last decade this force still represents a formidable 
conventional military capability, particularly when compared to the lightly armed Kurdish and Shi-ite 
militias inside Iraq.[4] Of these opposition groups, only SCIRI is currently conducting active and ongoing 
resistance to Saddam - although the INC has claimed to be conducting sabotage operations inside Iraq. 
Continued Containment: "Smart Sanctions" and the Return of Weapons Inspections 
Amidst the saber rattling, the Bush Administration has apparently reached consensus within the United 
Nations Security Council to implement so called "smart sanctions" that will effectively end the trade 
embargo over non-military and dual-use goods while retaining U.N. financial controls over use of Iraq's oil 
revenues. A military embargo would remain in place. It remains unclear whether the Maritime Interception 
Operations, administered by coalition naval forces in the Gulf, will continue if final agreement is reached 
to implement the smart sanctions. It is also unclear how the idea of smart sanctions fits within the 
construct of the Bush Doctrine, since it is possible to see the re-integration of Saddam into the 
international community if UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix declares (following weapons inspections) that 
Iraq is disarmed. 
Some commentators have pointed to the contradictory nature of an approach that emphasizes regime 
change while at the same time seeking accommodation in the United Nations to implement smart 
sanctions.[5] This argument agrees with the premise that Iraq's WMD programs are a threat to 
international peace and security; but notes that without WMD Saddam becomes just another unsavory 
dictator. Thus, the thinking goes, we should build international consensus around the objective of 
returning weapons inspectors to Iraq and establishing a rigorous inspection and long-term monitoring 
regime. With Saddam disarmed under such a system, he then ceases to be a threat and regime change 
becomes unnecessary.[6]  
Arab Response 
The region's response to possible U.S. military action in Iraq was arguably delivered at the March 27-28, 
2002 Arab League summit in Beirut when Kuwait and Iraq each signed a "rapprochement" and Saudi 
Crown Prince Abdullah's openly embraced Iraqi delegate Izzat Ibrahim. In this rapprochement, Iraq 
agreed in writing to honor Kuwait's security and sovereignty - effectively renouncing any hostile intentions 
towards Kuwait - a critical requirement in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. Outstanding issues still 
remain between Kuwait and Iraq - notably an accounting for 605 Kuwaiti POWs as well as the return of 
Kuwaiti stolen property. The summit also endorsed Crown Prince Abdullah's peace proposal that offered 
recognition of Israel in exchange for a withdrawal to Israel's 1967 borders. The summit served to illustrate 
the dramatic polarization of the region caused by the ongoing Al-Aqsa intifada. Despite the Bush 
Administration's efforts to separate the issues, the intifada makes it virtually impossible for the United 
States to muster regional support for an invasion of Iraq. There is a belief in some quarters, however, that 
the opposition by Arab leaders is for public consumption only and that they will follow forceful and 
decisive U.S. leadership on Iraq.[7] If public pronouncements are to be believed, however, it appears 
unlikely that the United States will be granted permission to use military facilities in the region - thereby 
dramatically complicating any sizable conventional military operation in Iraq. The United States would 
probably need the use of host nation military facilities and airspace in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Qatar to launch an invasion of Iraq.  
Coalition on War Against Terrorism in Danger?  
Without direct evidence linking Iraq to the attacks of September 11th the United States faces difficulties in 
convincing its partners to take the war on terrorism to Baghdad. While acknowledging the threat that 
Saddam's unmonitored WMD programs pose, even the Europeans appear skeptical of our motivations in 
building a case to attack Iraq as part of the war on terrorism. This leaves the United States in the position 
of acting unilaterally -- one result of which may be the compromising of its ability to count on others to 
help fight the global war on terrorism.[8] 
Conclusion 
Unconfirmed press reports describe an increased U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf that is linked 
to potential military action in Iraq.[9] Should the decision be made to actually invade Iraq, the buildup of 
these forces will become even more apparent to the American public and the international community -- 
and a more public debate around this issue will result. Polls indicate that Americans by and large want 
Saddam Hussein removed from power, though there is no consensus on exactly how Saddam's removal 
is to be accomplished.[10] The aura of American battlefield superiority and the Nintendo-like capacity to 
apparently destroy targets at a distance at will presents a compelling and attractive vision to the public. 
But wars are never cost-free, gun camera footages notwithstanding. American ground troops in 
Afghanistan are discovering this first-hand. And, American battlefield superiority does not necessarily 
translate into operational invincibility. In Iraq, the international community faces an amoral foe in Saddam 
Hussein who values his regime security above all else and will exercise all means at his disposal to 
preserve his hold on power. It is difficult to predict the costs of another war against Iraq, but a starting 
point might be U.S. military personnel (not to mention other countries in the region, to include Israel) 
attacked by chemical and biological weapons, which if nothing else, could result in massive casualties in 
a civilian population that is totally unprepared for such an eventuality. This is not an argument against 
invasion; it is simply a call to carefully consider the immutable laws of unintended consequences as we 
set a course for confrontation and conflict with Saddam. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources and  
our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
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